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 ABSTRACT 
 In agency theory, it is asserted that boards with a high ratio of outside 
directors can monitor management effectively, but empirical results from 
past studies are not consistent. We suggest the “process perspective” as an 
alternative approach, arguing that the board activity, rather than the board 
structure, impacts the firm’s financial performance; and apply this perspective 
to Korean companies. We test the impact of board structure on both board 
activity and profitability, and then the impact of board activity on firm 
profitability. The test results were: the board structure [measured by the ratio 
of outside directors in the board membership] does not have positive 
influence on either board activity or profitability [measured by ROA] in 
Korean firms; however, the board activity, measured by the rate of outside 
directors’ participation in board meetings, has a positive relationship with a 
firm’s profitability. We explain this as a decoupling, based on institution 
theory, which occurred in the process of forced Korean governance reform 
of 1998. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, agency problems of top management have been recognized since the 
report of Berle and Means (1932), while in Korea, corporate governance has been an 
important issue in both academia and management since the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997. Berle and Means (1932) reported that professional managers controlled most large 
US companies and the significant power of these top managers could sacrifice the 
interests of shareholders in pursuing their own profit. In Korea, chaebol, Korean business 
groups, led the rapid economic growth of the country duringthe 1970s and 1980s, but 
their governance failure was blamed for the collapse of many of them during the crisis 
(Cho and Kim, 2007). The chaebol were not successful in developing their core 
competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) to compete in the global market of 1990s.Prior 
to the Asian crisis, Korean corporate board of directors were actually powerless (Cho and 
Kim, 2007). A Korean firm’s board was composed only of insider directors who were the 
subordinates of top management and did not have controlling power over management. 
In 1998, all companies listed in Korean Stock Exchanges were required to recruit outside 
directors into their boards, meeting the minimum required outsider ratio of 25% of total 
directors. This first-time inclusion of outside directors in the boards of large Korean firms 
was a major change in the structure of these boards. 
Corporate governance is a popular topic in current management research; however, it 
is argued that corporate governance structures are different across nations, because each 
nation has different institutional environments (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Most 
countries have different backgrounds for the study of corporate governance. In this sense, 
a comparative study of corporate governance across nations is meaningful. In studying 
international corporate governance, integration and diversity should be considered 
concurrently (Chizema and Kim, 2010). During the last two to three decades, the US 
model of governance structure spread to the rest of the world, establishing itself as the 
global standard. The governance structure of firms around the world converged to the US 
model. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997, the appointment of outside directors 
was forced on the most large Korean companies. Regarding the outside director 
regulation of 1998, there are still disputes whether this new system functions well in 
Korean companies.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to assess the immediate, short-term impact of 
the outside directors in the newly reformed boards of large Korean firms on the firms’ 
financial performance. Our assessment concurrently applies two approaches (i.e., the 
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structure and process approaches) to examine corporate board effectiveness. In agency theory, 
a board with a high ratio of outside directors can monitor the management effectively. In 
most studies about board effectiveness, the main concern is whether this board 
"structure"may influence the firm’s financial performance positively. Applying the 
structure approach, we question if the ratio of outside directors on a Korean board 
impacted the board’s activeness and the firm’s profitability. However, past studies about 
the relationship between the board structure and corporate performance did not produce 
consistent results (Dalton et al., 1998). Therefore, we apply also the process approach to our 
assessment of Korean boards’ effectiveness. Thisprocess approach highlights the roles of 
board of directors in corporate management process, and by applying this approach, we 
intend to introduce the board process that is regarded to influence corporate management 
directly. We subscribe to a view that the effectiveness of outside directors is dependent on 
whether the directors work well as a team or a working group in board meetings rather 
than on how the board is structured. Even if the ratio of outside directors on a Korean 
board is relatively low, the outsiders may play their roles of monitoring and/or supporting 
the management effectively as long as they participate in the board meetings actively. 
Applying the process approach, we question if the level of a Korean board’s activity, 
measured by the rate of outside directors’ participation in board meetings, impacted the 
firm’s profitability positively. We apply these two approaches concurrently to our 
assessment of the effectiveness of the outside directors on Korean corporate boards 
during the three-year period of 2002 to 2004. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Past studies about board of directors and their limitations 
Most existing studies on corporate governance assumed that effective boards are 
comprised of  a high proportion of  outside directors (Lorsh and MacIver, 1993; Mizruich, 
1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In these studies, effective boards were represented by a 
high ratio of  outside directors. Such a preference for outsider-dominated boards was 
largely based on agency theory.  
According to agency theory, separation of  ownership and control led to the self-
interested actions of  managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Managers, using their power in and knowledge of  management, tended to sacrifice 
shareholders' wealth in pursuit of  their own interest. Agency theorists argued that the 
opportunistic behaviours of  managers should be monitored to protect shareholders' 
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interest. One of  the monitoring mechanisms was an effective board of  directors (Walsh 
and Seward, 1990). Effective boards would include many outside directors. Because 
outside directors, being independent of  management, could play monitoring roles, they 
were believed to make the board effective. 
A limited number of  empirical studies demonstrated that outside directors were 
positively associated with corporate financial performance (Ezzamal and Watson, 1993; 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Schellenger, Wood, and 
Tashakori, 1989). However, other empirical studies found that the purported positive 
impact of  outsiders on corporate performance did not exist consistently (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1995; Dalton et al., 1998). Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand 
and Johnson. (1998) offered two explanations about the negative relationships between 
outside directors and firm’s performance. First, stewardship theory, favoring inside 
directors, explained that managers were inherently trustworthy and not prone to 
misappropriate corporate resources (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994). 
Because managers were stewards in their organizations and worked diligently to attain the 
maximization of  shareholders' wealth, it was argued that independent monitoring by 
outside directors would not be necessary. The second explanation was that inside directors 
have superior knowledge about the firm and this made them evaluate management issues 
more effectively (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk, 1991; 
Boyd, 1994; Hill and Snell, 1988). Other research papers could not find any significant 
relationship between board composition and firm’s performance (Chagantti, Mahajan, and 
Sharma, 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; Zahra and Stanton, 1988).  
In the existing studies about boards based on agency theory, numerous debates 
emerged regarding the appropriateness of  CEO duality (Rechner and Dalton, 1991), 
board size (Dalton et al., 1999), board ownership (Barnhart, Marr, and Rosenstein, 1994; 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishiny, 1989; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) in addition to the 
outsider ratio. These factors were also suggested to make boards effective in practice, and 
were incorporated in the guidelines or codes for corporate governance.  Soon, many firms 
started to adopt these guidelines to signal their efforts at governance reform, and to 
acquire legitimacy and support from the public (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This 
“institution theory perspective” could offer another explanation about the inconsistent 
results from empirical studies about the relationship between board structure and 
corporate performance. 
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The institution theory perspective supported a process approach to governance 
research. Under this approach, a board of  directors was regarded as a team that played the 
roles of  monitoring and advising top management. An effective board as a team required 
various kinds of  conditions, among which the board’s independence from management 
might be only one. This process approach, by which scholars believed that the board 
effectiveness was dependent on the process, was adopted by several studies. Payne, 
Benson and Finegold (2009) pointed out that a limited number of  studies examined 
various attributes of  boards that were believed to contribute to the effectiveness of  
boards at playing positive roles to improve corporate performance. Other studies explored 
what made boards function well as a group to influence organization’s performance 
(Forbes and Miliken, 1999; Daily, Dalton, and Canella, 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003; Ruigrok, Peck, and Keller, 2006; Steils, 2001). When one studied a board as a team, 
it was usually difficult to examine what was happening inside the board. The researcher 
had, in many cases, only limited access to examine the inner workings of  a board. Many 
directors feared that revealing boardroom activities, or rating the effectiveness of  the 
board, could have adverse effects on their relationship with investors and other board 
members (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). Therefore, a corporate board was regarded as a 
“theoretical black box” to those researchers (Daily et al., 2003; Leblanc, 2004). 
Forbes and Miliken (1999) asserted, based on their integration of  past studies, board 
effectiveness shared the same attributes as many pre-existing models of  team effectiveness. 
Many studies already explained the differences between high and low performing teams. 
The same elaborations could be made to construct an effective board as a team. 
Sonnenfeld (2002) explained that an effective board functioned as a robust social system. 
He added that structural characteristics of  boards as the criteria for “most-admired board” 
in magazines did not vary much across companies. Sonnenfeld argued that considering 
how a board operated well as a social system was as important as evaluating what kinds of  
structural characteristics were present in a board.  
Payne et al. (2009) suggested five attributes to measure the effectiveness of  boards of  
directors: knowledge, information, power, incentives and opportunity/time. These five 
attributes could promote board effectiveness, which in turn, influenced corporate 
performance. Effective boards played two roles (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Boards could monitor 
management (i.e., monitoring role) and also provided resources to management (i.e., 
resource role). To play these roles well, boards required sufficient knowledge, information, 
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power, incentives and time to function. Boards met periodically and consisted of  
interdependent groups of  people and therefore, boards—more than other groups—faced 
interaction difficulties that could prevent them from fulfilling their tasks (Hambrick, 
Werder, and Zajac, 2008). In the circumstances, board effectiveness depended on social-
psychological processes, particularly those relating to group participation, coordination, 
and open discussion (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Forbes and Miliken, 1999; Hambrick 
et al., 2008; Zattonney, Gnan, and Huse, 2015). The relevance of  these three processes for 
the effectiveness of  boards was supported empirically by recent studies (e.g., Minichilli et 
al., 2012; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). 
 
Boards in Korea 
Prior to the Asian crisis of  1997, board of  directors were actually powerless in Korea 
(Cho and Kim, 2007). A Korean firm’s board was composed only of  insider directors who 
were subordinates of  top management and did not have controlling power over 
management. In 1998, outside directors were introduced in Korea and all companies listed 
in Korean Stock Exchanges had to include outside directors for 25% or more of  total 
directors.  
In recent studies on corporate governance in large Korean companies (or chaebol), 
agency problems were understood to exist in the controlling shareholders (Joh, 2003; 
Chang, 2003; Kim, Kim, and Lee, 2008). Contrary to the American corporate governance 
structure that was mentioned earlier, the controlling shareholder of  a chaebol possessed a 
supreme power in managing the affiliates, and in pursuit of  his or her own interest, tended 
to sacrifice the wealth of  a large number of  minority shareholders. This was called the 
principal-principal conflict (Young et al., 2008). The self-interest pursuing behaviors of  the 
chaebol’s controlling shareholders were blamed for the widespread corporate failures 
during the Asian crisis of  1997; and various stakeholders stressed the necessity for a major 
governance reform in large Korean companies. A condition of  the IMF bailout program 
in Korea after the crisis was the introduction of  outside directors in the boardrooms in 
Korea. 
Chizema and Kim (2010) explained the process of  board reform in Korea in terms of  
institution theory perspective. In institution theory, managers make decisions not only to 
improve internal efficiency but merely to adapt to outside pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). The same logic could be applied to the board reform in Korea. Korean chaebol did 
not want to reduce their controlling power in response to the Korean governance reform 
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in the aftermath of  the Asian financial crisis of  1997, but in order to adapt to the post-
crisis outside pressure for restructuring, they had to accept the well-known governance 
standards that required them to include outside directors on their boards. As a result, 
many Korean firms appeared to use the best practices of  corporate governance. Yet, many 
critics in Korea still had serious doubts about the independence of  outside directors in 
Korean firms. Most outside directors were believed to be recruited by the controlling 
shareholders or the management and were not regarded to be independent from 
management. 
Some researchers tried to determine the influence of  the reformed board 
composition on corporate performance in Korean firms. Given the fact that most outside 
directors in Korean companies were not independent from the management, they could 
not play their monitoring role effectively. Between the two kinds of  roles of  outside 
directors (i.e., the monitoring and resource roles) that were expected, only the resource 
role of  outside directors were valued in Korean firms. Due to their lack of  independence 
from management, outside directors were not able to monitor the opportunistic behaviors 
of  the controlling shareholders; instead, they could only provide outside resources, such as 
their social networks with the government and financial institutions. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL 
As we mentioned earlier, most past studies on boards' function measured the effectiveness 
of  the board in terms of  board composition, but their results were not consistent. In 
Korea, the inconsistent role of  board composition in corporate performance seemed to 
be more evident since the reformed boards of  directors in Korean firms were in their 
infancy. Outside directors were newly introduced to Korean companies in 1998 and only 
about 15 years have passed from their introduction. During the governance reform 
process after the crisis of  1997, most Korean firms adopted a set of  generally accepted 
codes of  corporate governance. Among these codes, a high ratio of  outsiders in the 
boards was regarded as a symbol of  good corporate governance. In addition, the Korean 
government required all firms listed in Korean stock exchanges to maintain the 
proportion of  outside directors for at least 25% of  total directors. 
After the crisis, all Korean firms faced strong pressure for restructuring to improve 
competitiveness. Their governance reform was, in some sense, their effort to adapt to this 
institutional pressure. Their “forced” governance reform was understood not as a means 
to protect their shareholders' interest based on agency theory, but as a mechanism to adapt 
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to their outside pressure. This interpretation was plausible only by the institution theory 
perspective, which was a sociological approach in explaining governance reform process. 
A number of  scholars also performed similar studies in a purely Asian context. Peng 
(2004) and Yoshikawa and McGuire (2008) examined governance reforms in Japan and 
China from the institution theory perspective. The pressure for governance reform was 
applied to Japanese and Chinese companies and these two studies also explained 
governance reform in Japan and China as a process to adapt to the external pressure. Peng 
(2004) reported that the introduction of  outside directors in Chinese companies was made 
as an institutional isomorphism process and therefore, outside directors in Chinese 
companies did not effectively play their roles in monitoring management. Yoshikawa and 
McGuire (2008) also showed that governance reform process in Japanese companies, 
being a forced reform, often led to decoupling.  
As far as Korean firms, they recruited enough outside directors to meet or exceed the 
minimum required outsider ratio of  25% of  total directors, but this was understood to be 
an effort to accept outside pressure rather than to protect shareholders and increase 
corporate competitiveness. Some companies tried to use the new governance structures in 
order to encourage their managers to make good decisions, but many other firms seemed 
to employ outside directors only as a gesture to showcase their efforts at restructuring. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the relationship between the outsider ratio aboard and the 
Korean firm’s financial performance is insignificant, as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The outsider ratio in a board is not significantly related to the firm’s profitability. 
 
When we interpret corporate governance reform in Korea in terms of  institutional 
theory, firms tended to display institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in 
the form of  accepting outside pressure for governance reform. As DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) indicated, institutional isomorphism could be triggered by three sources: coercive 
pressure, imitational pressure and normative pressure. The pressure from government and 
various stakeholders (coercive pressure), the pressure coming from uncertainty (imitational 
pressure), and the pressure from various educational institutions (normative pressure) 
propelled many Korean firms to adopt generally accepted codes of  corporate governance. 
Institutional isomorphism formed in these companies resulted in two divergent outcomes. 
In some companies, their reformed governance structures were harmonized with their 
existing management procedures and functioned effectively. However, in many other 
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companies, a new governance mechanism did not fit in the existing management; and it 
decoupled. Meyer and Rowan (1977) explained that “decoupling” could happen when a 
new system could not play suitable roles inside an organization, and the new system 
became meaningless or functioned differently from how it was supposed to function.  
Decoupling, we suspected, was the prevailing outcome of  the Korean corporate 
governance reform that required large Korean corporations to introduce outside directors.  
This decoupling might mean that the proportion (25% or higher) of  the outside directors 
in a Korean board would not affect the level of  their active functioning on the board, 
which was measured by the rate of  outside directors’ participation in board meetings (for 
the theoretical and operational basis for our selection of  this attribute, please refer to the 
second and third paragraphs following our statement of  Hypothesis 2).Our second 
hypothesis, reflecting our assumption of  decoupling, is stated as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The outsider ratio in a board is not significantly related to the rate of  outside 
directors’ participation in board meetings. 
 
The primary purpose of  our paper was to assess the immediate, short-term impact of  
the outside directors in newly reformed Korean boards of  directors on the firms’ financial 
performance. Our assessment was to apply concurrently two approaches (i.e., the structure 
and process approaches) to researching corporate board effectiveness. In the course of  
developing the Hypotheses 1 and 2, we applied the structure approach. 
Now we turn our attention to using the process approach to our assessment of  Korean 
boards’ effectiveness. This process approach highlights the role of  boards of  directors in 
corporate management, and by applying this approach, we intend to introduce the board 
process that is regarded to influence corporate management directly. We subscribe to a 
view that the effective process in board meetings is dependent on whether the outside 
directors work well as a team or a working group. Regardless of  the outsiders’ ratio, the 
outside directors can function effectively to monitor or support the management if  it 
works well as a team. Even if  a board is composed of  relatively small number of  outside 
directors, these outsiders may play their roles of  monitoring and/or supporting the 
management effectively as long as they actively participate in the board meetings. Then, 
what are the proper attribute(s) of  the outsiders’ activities in board meetings? 
 We chose the rate of  outside directors’ participation in their board meetings as the 
attribute representing how active they were on the boards, because it was the only data 
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item representing the quality of  outsiders’ board activity that we could obtain from our 
primary source of  data about Korean outside directors), and because of  the theoretical 
support we received from the literature on effective board process (refer to page 3).Boards 
meet periodically and consist of  interdependent groups of  people and therefore, boards—
more than other groups—have interaction difficulties. Improvement in interaction among 
directors can make possible the better fulfilment of  board tasks (Hambrick et al., 2008). 
Group participation, coordination and open discussion are very important for the 
effective social process in the board (Zattoney et al., 2015). The most basic requirement 
for the effective social process of  the board is the high level of  commitment by individual 
directors to participate in the board meetings. The rate of  outside directors’ participation 
in board meetings can represent the degree of  outside directors’ group participation, 
coordination and open discussion in board meetings. Our third hypothesis states a positive 
relationship between the rate of  outside directors’ participation in board meetings and the 
firm’s profitability, as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The rate of  outside directors’ participation in board meetings is positively related to 
the firm’s profitability.  
 
Figure 1. Research model 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data sources and sample 
To test our hypotheses, we collected financial data for Korean companies listed in the 
Korean stock exchanges from the TS 2000 database. This database was maintained by the 
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Korean Listed Companies Association based on the annual reports of  listed companies. 
This database was updated annually and was one of  the most credible sources of  
corporate financial information in Korea. The board data were acquired from the website 
of  the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) of  Korea. The board data included the number 
of  total directors and outside directors, and the participation rate of  outside directors in 
the board meetings. The data were collected for the three-year period of  2002 to 2004. 
The purpose of  this study was to investigate the immediate, short-term impacts of  the 
introduction of  outsider directors in Korean corporate boards on the financial 
performance of  those Korean firms; and therefore, testing the hypotheses during the early 
years following the introduction of  outsider directors was reasonable. Because the board 
data from the website of  FSS were available only from 2002 and forward, we gathered the 
data for the three years: from 2002 to 2004. We excluded banks and insurance companies 
because of  their atypical financial structures. As a result, the final sample size was 1,732 
firm-year observations. 
 
Research variables 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the financial performance of  the sample Korean 
companies. Among various measurements for financial performance, return on asset 
(ROA) was chosen. The data to calculate ROA was obtained from the TS 2000 database. 
Many studies in corporate governance used ROA as the proxy of  corporate financial 
performance (Ezzamal and Watson, 1993; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990) 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables are certain attributes of  a firm’s board composition and outside 
directors' participation. The data that were available on the website of  the FSS included 
the number of  directors, the number of  outside directors and participation rate of  outside 
directors. The participation rate was calculated by the number of  outside directors 
attending a board meeting divided by the total number of  outside directors. If  the board 
meetings were held multiple times in a year, the multiple participation rates were averaged 
for the year. 
 
Control variables 
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Our analysis considered following control variables: firm size, ownership rate of  
controlling shareholders, ownership rate of  foreign investors, debt ratio, R&D ratio, 
growth rate and year dummy. Firm size was measured by the natural log of  total assets. 
Firm size was believed to be largely related to corporate governance reform and firm 
performance. Korean economy tended to be dependent on large firms; and, as Chizema 
and Kim (2007) explained, large firms experienced more outside pressure for governance 
reform. The ownership rate of  controlling shareholders was calculated based on the 
shares owned by controlling shareholder and his/her family. The controlling shareholders 
were regarded to bring about agency problems in Korean companies (Chang, 2003; Cho 
and Kim, 2007; Joh, 2003). Foreign investors were considered to play an important role in 
corporate governance in emerging markets (Dalquist and Robertson, 2001). In most 
corporate governance studies about Korean firms, the ownership structure variables, 
including those two ownership rates stated above, were their primary focus. The debt ratio 
was usually regarded to be associated with governance changes (Peng, 2004). After the 
crisis, one of  the restructuring pressures on Korean firms was for them to decrease their 
debt ratios. Therefore, debt ratios could significantly influence the management of  
Korean firms during the period of  2002 and 2004. The debt ratio was calculated as total 
debt divided by total capital. R&D intensity was a firm’s R&D spending in a year divided 
by the year’s total sales. Growth rate was calculated by the annual increase in sales amount. 
The R&D ratios and growth rates were related to the performance of  Korean firms in 
many papers. Lastly, because the corporate governance reform and firm performance 
were understood to be time-dependent, year dummy was included to capture the year 
effects. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients. The average outsider 
ratio in the Korea boards in our sample is about 28.5%, and the average numbers of  total 
directors and outside directors are 7 and 2, respectively. The average rate of  outside 
directors is a little higher than the Korean government’s standard of  25%. About 40% of  
the firms in our sample has outside directors for more than 25% of  total number of  
directors on the board. The average participation rate of  outside directors is about 75%. 
The ownership rates of  controlling shareholders and foreign investors in our sample are 
40% and 11%, respectively. The average debt size is 129% of  capital amount. Before the 
crisis, the debt ratio of  Korean firms was very high; and the Korean government forced 
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all listed companies to reduce the debt ratio to below 200%. The debt ratio in our sample 
showed the restructuring result of  Korean firms after the crisis. It is interesting that the 
correlation coefficients between board variables and ownership variables are significant. 
Controlling owners’ ownership rate is negatively correlated with board variables, while the 
foreign investors’ ownership rate is positively correlated with board variables. It may be 
interpreted that controlling shareholders are hesitant to a board reform; while foreign 
investors tend to support the reform. Another interesting finding is that growth rate 
measured by the increase of  sale volume is correlated significantly to the most board 
variables and ownership variables. In a corporate governance research, the researcher may 
need to consider the significant relationship of  sales growth with various governance 
variables. 
The regression results that are summarized in Table 2 appear very interesting. In 
testing our Hypothesis 1, we examined the relationship between board structure and ROA. 
This is shown in models 2 through 5 in Table 2. We found that both the outsider ratio in 
the board and the number of  outsiders have a negative relationship with ROA. This result 
is inconsistent with the general belief  that a larger outsider ratio in the board contributes 
to corporate performance. In the test of  Hypothesis 2 in models 8 through 11 in Table 2, 
the relationships between board variables and the participation rates of  outside directors 
are also negative. From the results of  Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we found that 
outside directors in Korean firms do not function positively to improve corporate 
management. Our finding about Korean firms does not support the widely-held belief  
that a larger ratio of  outside directors is required to make governance structure sounder 
(Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt, 1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Tihany, Hoskisson, and Hitt, 
2003). In contrast, our Hypothesis 3 test result, which is summarized in model 6 in Table 
2, shows that the participation rate of  outside directors is positively related with the firm’s 
ROA. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
 
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1.ROA 0.12 .17 1.0             
2.Outsider ratio .285 .136 .003 1.0            
3.Outsiders 2.11 1.39 .052* .829*** 1.0           
4.Directors 7.17 2.41 .078** .203*** .657*** 1.0          
5.Above 25% .40 .489 .005 .736*** .623*** .190*** 1.0         
6.Parti. Rate .75 .272 .069** .067** -.008 -.161*** -.043+ 1.0        
7.Size 12.47 1.42 .246** .484*** .627*** .456*** .305*** .091** 1.0       
8.Cont. Share 40.1 16.8 .188** -.161*** -.167*** -.079** -.088*** .041 -.089** 1.0      
9.Foreig. Inv. 11.4 16.4 .210*** .244*** .379*** .335*** .118*** ..083** .505*** -.082** 1.0     
10.R&D ratio .01 .014 -.073** .054* .056* .058* .006 -.008 -.007 -.059 .062 1.0    
11.Debt ratio 1.29 5.29 -.070* .048+ .006 -.036 .038 .004 -.030 -.014 -.050 -.019 1.0   
12.Growth rate 4.12 2.47 .051* .223*** .256*** .124*** .122*** .045+ .310*** -.051* .143*** .076** -.007 1.0  
13.Year dummy 1.33 .47 .058* -.022 -.017 .007 -.030 .018 -.013 -.015 -.001 -.014 .006 .138*** 1.0 
14.Year dummy 2.35 .47 -.040 .022 .009 -.042+ .046+ .005 .034 .018 .024 .042+ -.021 -.061** -.513*** 
***: p < .001,  ** : p< .01,  * : p< .05,  + : p<.10 
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Table 2. Regression result 
Dependent variable: ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -.316(.000)*** -.329(.000)*** -.335(.000)*** -.316(.000)*** -322(.000)*** -.344(.000)*** 
Outsider ratio  -.092(.006)**     
Outsiders   -.011(.003)**    
Directors    -.001(.433)   
Above 25%     -.008(.280)  
Parti. Rate      .036(.008)** 
Control variable:       
Size .023(.000)*** .026(.000)*** .028(.000)*** .024(.000)*** .024(.000)*** .023(.000)*** 
Cont. Share .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** 
Foreig. Inv. .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** .001(.000)*** 
R&D ratio -.162(.528) -.139(.589) -.141(.582) -.167(.516) -.150(.569) -.142(.587) 
Debt ratio .001(.113) .001(.166) .001(.135) .001(.108) .001(.125) .001(.134) 
Growth rate .001(.357) -8.89E-5(.549) -8.89E-5(.549) .001(.358) .001(.389) .001(.319) 
Year dummy1 .013(.160) .013(.140) .013(.143) .012(.174) .013(.157) .013(.172) 
Year dummy2 .009(.917) 9.50E-5(.991) -.001(.929) -.002(.848) -.001(.951) .005(.598) 
       
R2 .091 .096 .096 .091 .091 .099 
Adjusted R2 .086 .090 .090 .085 .085 .093 
F-Statistics 17.257*** 16.147*** 16.245*** 15.294*** 12.362*** 16.032*** 
***: p < .001,  ** : p< .01,  * : p< .05,  + : p<.10 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of  this paper is to assess the immediate, short-term impact of  the 
outside directors in newly reformed Korean boards of  directors on the firms’ financial 
performance. Our assessment was to apply concurrently two approaches (i.e., the structure 
and process approaches) to researching corporate board effectiveness. The first two 
hypotheses (the Hypotheses 1 and 2) were testing the widely-held expectation based on 
the structure perspective of  agency theory:(1) a higher outsider ratio in the board could lead 
to higher corporate performance; and (2) a higher outsider ratio would become the 
foundation on which the board function actively. In testing Hypothesis 1 (the Models 2-5 
in Table 2), the outsider ratio in a board of  a Korean firm initially appeared to be 
negatively related to the firm’s ROA. However, the coefficients of  variation (R2) were 
rather small (with the adjusted R2 of  0.090 or less across the Models 2-5), perhaps due to 
the obvious omission in our models in which many other variables determine or explain 
the firm’s ROA. The t-statistics were insignificant with the probability values (p-values in 
Table 2) that ranged from low values of  0.006 (in Model 2) and 0.003 (in Model 3) to very 
high values of  0.433 (in Model 4) and 0.280 (in Model 5). Based on these weak statistical 
parameters, we estimated that the ROA of  a large Korean firm was not explained by the 
ratio of  outside members in the firm’s board. In our test of  Hypothesis 2 (the Model 8 in 
Table 2), the outsider ratio in the board of  Korean firm initially appeared to be negatively 
related to the rate of  outside directors’ participation in board meetings. In a close 
examination, we noticed the R2 value of  the Model 8 for testing Hypothesis 2 was an 
extremely small number of  0.014. We also noticed the insignificant t-statistics with the 
probability value, p-value of  0.304 for the same model. Therefore, we estimated that the 
participation rate of  outsiders was not statistically explained by the ratio of  outside 
members in a Korean corporate board; and their board meeting participation rate was not 
determined by their ratio in the board. These two test results, taken together, indicated a 
strong likelihood that the proportion of  outside directors in a reformed Korean board did 
not affect their participation in board functions and the firm’s return on assets.  
The most interesting finding was that the participation rate of  outside directors in 
board meetings of  a Korean firm had a positive relationship with the firm’s profitability. 
In our test of  Hypothesis 3 (the Model 6 in Table 2) that related the outsider participation 
rate to the firm’s ROA, R2 was rather small (about 0.1), perhaps due to our omission of  
many other variables that could determine or explain the firm’s ROA in the model. 
Fortunately, the t-statistics were significant with the probability value, p-value of  0.008, 
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which was less than 0.01 for the same model. We used the process approach to relate the 
outside directors’ activity on the board (i.e., board activity) to the firm’s performance. We 
subscribed to a view that, regardless of  the outsiders’ ratio in the board structure, the 
outside directors could function effectively to monitor or support the management as long 
as they actively participated in the board meetings. Their participation rates could 
represent the degree of  outside directors’ group participation, coordination and open 
discussion in board meetings. We chose the rate of  outside directors’ participation in their 
board meetings as the attribute representing how active they were on the boards. 
Therefore, this finding means that those Korean firms in which their outside directors 
were allowed to play their monitoring and resource roles more actively and effectively 
tended to achieve higher profitability.  
There are two explanations for the insignificant impact of  outsiders on the firm’s 
profitability and board activity. The first explanation follows. In 1998, all companies listed 
in the Korean Stock Exchange were required to recruit outside directors into their board 
of  directors, meeting the minimum required outsider ratio of  25% of  total directors. This 
first-time inclusion of  outside directors in the boards of  large Korean firms in 1998 was a 
major change in the structure of  these boards. Our sample period was 2002 to 2004, and 
only 3 to 5 years elapsed since the year when the outside directors were introduced in 
Korean corporate boards for the first time. Therefore, one would find it difficult to expect 
them to play positive roles in the governance process, and to help improve the profitability 
of  the large Korean firms.  
The second explanation is related to the unique socio-economic circumstances in 
Korea during the period of  the governance reform that took place in the aftermath of  the 
crisis of  1997. The governance reform, including the first-time introduction of  outside 
directors in Korean corporate boards, was accomplished not through the voluntary effort 
of  the firms but their compulsory acceptance of  outside pressures (Chizema and Kim, 
2010). The introduction of  outside directors in their boards was only a signal showing the 
firms’ intent to cooperate with the reform. During the sample period of  2002 to 2004, 
there were many articles in the Korean press about the outside directors; and a majority of  
these articles pointed out the ineffectiveness of  outside directors in Korean boards. The 
fundamental problem was noted as the lack of  outside directors’ independence from 
management, because most outside directors were suspected to have close relationships 
with the management. A change in an organization caused by institutional pressures can 
either adapt to the existing organization or decouple from its intended function. 
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Throughout the 1990s, the US-style of  governance practices that included the 
appointment of  outside directors spread to the world. We could recognize both 
convergence and diversity in understanding the worldwide spread of  these governance 
structures (Chizema and Kim, 2010). Many companies in the world accepted outside 
directors because they were pressured by outside stakeholders, including governments, 
international institutions and shareholders. It was the convergence of  governance 
structure across countries that forced firms in many countries to employ outside directors 
to monitor management, imitating the American governance structure. Even if  the 
American practices were imitated in many countries, their practical applications might 
differ across countries. Aguilera and Jackson (2003) explained that such differences were 
brought about by different local institutional environments. These differences in practical 
application across countries meant the international diversity in corporate governance 
practice.   
In conclusion, our empirical assessment of  the immediate, short-term impact of  the 
Korean corporate governance reform that took place in the aftermath of  the Asian 
Financial Crisis of  1997 was that the outside directors were basically accepted into Korean 
corporate boards only as those Korean firms’ adaptation to the outside pressures in Korea. 
As a result, their actual functioning in many large Korean firms seemed to have decoupled 
from their intended function in the short run. The results from testing the short-term 
impact of  the reformed Korean board structure with 25% or higher proportion of  
outsiders, as noted earlier, indicated a strong likelihood that the high proportion of  
outside directors affected neither the rate of  outside directors’ participation in board 
meetings (i.e., their board activity) nor the firm’s profitability. However, our process-
focused testing of  the impact of  the varying rates of  outside directors’ participation in 
board meetings at Korean firms show a positive relationship between the participation 
rate (representing the board activity) and the firm’s profitability measured by the ROA. It 
is an encouraging sign that those Korean firms that obtained the outsiders’ high degree of  
participation in their board meetings appeared to have reaped the beneficial impact on the 
firm’s profitability. In other words, those firms with a higher degree of  outsider’s board 
activity got higher return from their first-time investment in outside directors, while others 
with a lower level of  outsiders’ board activity got a lower return.  
One major limitation of  this study is the sample period. Outside directors were 
introduced in Korea about 15 years ago, but our research sample period covered only the 
early three years: 2002, 2003 and 2004, because our research aim was to examine the 
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immediate, short-term impact of  the “forced on” (as opposed to voluntary) introduction 
of  outsider directors in Korean boards in 1998, preferably from the perspective of  
institution theory. This is because this perspective gave us capabilities to interpret and 
explain the immediate impact of  outside directors during the earliest period after their 
introduction in Korea. There were two possible scenarios for the introduction of  outside 
directors in Korean companies: decoupling or adaptation. During our sample period of  
2002 to 2004, there were wide-spread suspicions that the actual functioning of  outside 
directors in those Korean firms were somewhat decoupled from their original intent. We 
would need to examine if  the perspective of  institution theory could still be applied to the 
sample in the long term, even beyond our sample period. In 2014, outside directors in 
Korea were still questioned on their independence from the management and their 
effectiveness as a monitoring mechanism. Other interested researchers may want to 
examine whether the decoupling continued beyond our sample period. Another limitation 
is that this paper is only an exploratory study to explain the process of  corporate 
governance reform in Korea. Other interested researchers may want to perform case 
analysis in depth to validate the process perspective about the role of  board activity. 
Another limitation is that only the rate of  outsiders’ participation in board meetings is 
used to represent the degree of  the outsiders’ board activity in this paper, and that our 
selection of  only this single attribute value might not be sufficient to validate the 
relationship between their board activity and the firm’s profitability. This limitation of  our 
study was due to the circumstance that the board data that were available on the website 
of  the Financial Supervisory Service of  Korea during the period of  this study contained 
no other information than the outsider’s participation rate that we could use to represent 
the board activity. Lastly, the R2values were rather small in our regression analysis. This 
limitation was due to our obvious omission in our models of  many other variables that 
could determine or explain the firm’s ROA. Fortunately, the t-statistics were significant for 
model 6 which related the outsider participation rate to the firm’s ROA; and the statistical 
fitness of  this key model appeared to be fine. However, the R2 value of  the model 8 for 
testing Hypothesis 2 was extremely small. Considering also the insignificant t-statistics for 
model 8, we could readily estimate that the participation rate of  outsiders was not 
statistically explained by the ratio of  outside members in a Korean corporate board; and 
their board meeting participation rate was determined independent of  their proportion in 
the board membership. 
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Although there have been many papers about the corporate governance of  Korean 
companies, we found that most of  these papers analysed the sources of  agency problems 
in Korean chaebols. We could find no paper analysing how the governance reform in 
Korean companies proceeded after the Asian Financial Crisis of  1997. Our paper 
intended to provide an explanation to help our audience understand the process of  
governance reform in Korea in the aftermath of  the crisis. Most management innovations 
were invented in the United States and spread to other countries. We needed to investigate 
the process through which these innovations were applied to other countries. This paper 
intended to shed light on the process through which a US-style of  governance mechanism 
was introduced in Korea. 
Major implications from this study may be suggested in three dimensions. First, Two 
viewpoints were presented for academic contribution. The effectiveness of  the board 
should be understood in terms of  its activity; and institution theory was employed to help 
explain the process of  governance reform in Korean firms. Second, policy makers need to 
consider the diversity of  corporate governance across nations; and the strong possibility 
that a forced reform may get decoupled from the originally expected function, at least 
during the early period after the reform.  Third, it is suggested that Korean corporate 
management develop a governance structure that encourages effective board activities. 
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